Optimal Policies for Convex Symmetric Stochastic Dynamic Teams and their
  Mean-field Limit by Sanjari, Sina & Yüksel, Serdar
ar
X
iv
:1
90
3.
11
47
6v
3 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  2
8 A
ug
 20
19
OPTIMAL POLICIES FOR CONVEX SYMMETRIC STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC
TEAMS AND THEIR MEAN-FIELD LIMIT ∗
SINA SANJARI AND SERDAR YU¨KSEL
Abstract. This paper studies convex stochastic dynamic team problems with finite and infinite time horizons
under decentralized information structures. First, we introduce two notions called exchangeable teams and sym-
metric information structures. We show that in convex exchangeable team problems an optimal policy exhibits a
symmetry structure. We give a characterization for such symmetrically optimal teams for a general class of con-
vex dynamic team problems under mild conditional independence conditions. In addition, through concentration of
measure arguments, we establish the convergence of optimal policies for teams with N decision makers to the cor-
responding optimal policies for symmetric mean-field teams with infinitely many decision makers. As a by-product,
we present an existence result for convex mean-field teams, where the main contribution of our paper is with respect
to the information structure in the system when compared with the related results in the literature that have either as-
sumed a classical information structure or a static information structure. We also apply these results to the important
special case of LQG team problems, where while for partially nested LQG team problems with finite time horizons
it is known that the optimal policies are linear, for infinite horizon problems the linearity of optimal policies has not
been established in full generality. We also study average cost finite and infinite horizon dynamic team problems with
a symmetric partially nested information structure and obtain globally optimal solutions where we establish linearity
of optimal policies. Moreover, we also study average cost infinite horizon LQG dynamic teams under sparsity and
delay constraints.
Key words. Stochastic teams, average cost optimization, decentralized control, mean-field teams
1. Introduction and literature review. Team problems consist of a collection of deci-
sion makers or agents acting together to optimize a common cost function, but not necessarily
sharing all the available information. The term stochastic teams refers to the class of team
problems where there exist randomness in the initial states, observations, cost realizations, or
the evolution of the dynamics. At each time stage, each agent only has partial access to the
global information which is defined by the information structure (IS) of the problem [43].
If there is a pre-defined order in which the decision makers act then the team is called a se-
quential team. For sequential teams, if each agent’s information depends only on primitive
random variables, the team is static. If at least one agent’s information is affected by an action
of another agent, the team is said to be dynamic. Information structures can be further cate-
gorized as classical, partially nested, and non-classical. An IS is classical if the information
of decision maker i (DMi) contains all of the information available to DMk for k < i. An IS
is partially nested, if whenever the action of DMk, for some k < i, affects the information
of DMi, then the information of DMi contains the information of DMk. An IS which is not
partially nested is non-classical. A detailed review is presented in [48].
Obtaining structural results in team problems is important towards establishing both ex-
istence and computational/approximation methods for optimal policies. In this paper, we
define the notion of exchangeable teams and symmetric information structures, and we show
that, for convex exchangeable dynamic teams with finite horizons, optimal policies exhibit a
symmetry structure (Theorem 2.7). For any number of DMs, this symmetry structure is more
relaxed when compared with the symmetry results developed earlier, e.g. in [35, 36] which
focused on problems under a static information structure, and is applicable for dynamic teams
which may not admit a static reduction, as long as convexity in policies holds for the team
problem.
There have been many studies involving decentralized stochastic control with infinitely
many decision makers. In particular, when the coupling among the decision makers is only
through some aggregate/average effect, such problems can be viewed within the umbrella
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of mean-field geams [26, 19], which were introduced as a limit model for non-cooperative
symmetricN -player differential games with mean-field interaction asN →∞. The solution
concept in game theory is often Nash equilibrium, and often under various characterizations
of it in dynamic Bayesian setups. In the context of decentralized stochastic control or teams,
these would correspond to person-by-person optimal solutions, and hence not necessarily
globally optimal solutions.
Nonetheless, on the existence as well as uniqueness and non-uniqueness results on equi-
libria, there have been several studies for mean-field games [26, 5, 13, 28, 20]. There have also
been several studies for mean-field games where the limits of sequences of Nash equilibria
have been investigated as the number of decision makersN →∞ (see e.g., [14, 23, 6, 26, 4]).
We refer interested readers to [12, 10] for a literature review and a detailed summary of some
recent results on mean-field games.
Some notable relevant studies from the mean-field literature are the following: In [14],
through a concentration of measures argument, it has been shown that sequences of ǫN - local
(for each player) Nash equilibria for N player games converge to a solution for the mean-
field game under exchangeability of the initial states and weak convergence of normalized
occupational measures to a deterministic measure [14, Theorem 5.1]. In [21], assumptions
on equilibrium policies of the large population mean-field symmetric stochastic differential
games have been presented to allow the convergence of asymmetric approximate Nash equi-
libria to a weak solution of the mean-field game [21, Theorem 2.6].
However, in these studies the information structures are restricted to the following mod-
els: In [14] the information structure is assumed to be static since strategies of each player are
assumed to be adapted to the filtration generated by his/her initial states and Wiener process
(also called distributed open-loop controllers in the mean-field games’ literature [21, 13, 12])
(see Remark 2 for details of this discussion). Convergence of Nash equilibria induced by
closed-loop controllers to a weak semi-Markov mean-field equilibrium has been established
in [23] for finite horizon mean-field game problems, where the classical information structure
(i.e., what would be a centralized problem in the team theoretic setup) has been considered.
For infinite horizon problems, in [11], an example of ergodic differential games with mean-
field coupling has been constructed such that limits of sequences of expected costs induced
by symmetric Nash-equilibrium of N -player games capture expected costs induced by many
more Nash-equilibruim policies including a mean-field equilibrium and social optima. In
[23], the classical information structure (a centralized problem) has been considered, where
in [11] it has been assumed that players have access to all the history of states of all players
but not controls (we note that in the team problem setup through using a classical result of
Blackwell [8] in the case where each DM knows all the history of states of all DMs, opti-
mal policies can be realized as one in the centralized problem where just the global state is a
sufficient statistic). Moreover, under relaxed regularity conditions on dynamics and the cost
function, a limit theory has been established for controlled McKean-Vlasov dynamics [22]
under the classical information structure, where through a similar analysis as in [14, 21], it
has been shown that the empirical measure of pairs of states and ǫN -open-loop optimal con-
trols converges weakly as N → ∞ to limit points in the set of pairs of states and optimal
controls of the McKean-Vlasov problem.
The above highlight the intricacies due to the information structure aspects: different
from the aforementioned studies above, we consider information structures that are not nec-
essarily static or classical. Also, in this paper we work with global optimality and not only
mean-field equilibria and we show the existence of a globally optimal policy for mean-field
team problems. On the other hand, in our paper since we work under the convexity assump-
tion, the information structure does not allow for mean-field coupling in the dynamics. We
also note that in prior work, [35], we studied static teams where under convexity and more
restrictive symmetry conditions, global optimality of a limit policy of a sequence of N -DM
optimal policies has been established.
In the context of stochastic teams with countably infinite number of decision makers, the
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gap between person by person optimality (Nash equilibrium in the game-theoretic context)
and global team optimality is significant since a perturbation of finitely many policies fails to
deviate the value of the expected cost, thus person by person optimality is a weak condition
for such a setup, and hence the results presented in the aforementioned papers may be in-
conclusive regarding global optimality of the limit equilibrium. For teams and social optima
control problems, the analysis has primarily focused on the LQGmodel where the centralized
performance has been shown to be achieved asymptotically by decentralized controllers (see
e.g., [18, 2, 3]).
We also obtain existence results on optimal policies for the setups considered. Compared
to the results on the existence of a globally optimal policy in team problems where (finite)
N -DM team problems has been considered [47, 15, 49, 34], we study convex team problems
with countably infinite number of decision makers.
Parts of our results in this paper correspond to Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) teams.
In [16], it has been shown that for teams with finite number of DMs, dynamic teams with
a partially nested information structure can be reduced to a static one ([16, 45]) where Rad-
ner’s theorem concludes global optimality of linear policies for LQG team problems [31].
However, for average cost infinite horizon, partially nested, LQG dynamic team problems
so far there has been no universal result establishing that a globally optimal policy is linear,
time-invariant, and stabilizing, and this has been often imposed apriori: In [33], the problem
of designing a linear, time-invariant, stabilizing, state feedback optimal policy for decen-
tralized H2-optimization problems, which satisfy the quadratically invariance property, has
been addressed by reparametrizing the problem as a convex problem (via Youla parametriza-
tion). In [32], it has been shown that for sequential team problems involving linear systems,
quadratic invariance and the partially nested property are equivalent. For a class of partially
ordered (POSET) systems, state space techniques have been utilized to obtain optimal, linear,
time-invariant, state feedback controllers for H2-optimization problems with sparsity con-
straints [40]. A similar result has been established in [41] where linearity and time invariance
have been imposed apriori. In [27], H2-optimization output feedback problems with two-
players have been considered and optimality results have been established when the optimal
policies are restricted to linear, time invariant, stabilizing policies. However, the results in
[27, 33, 40, 41] are inconclusive regarding global optimality. Our contribution here is to con-
sider average cost infinite horizon dynamic team problems without restricting the set of poli-
cies to those that are linear, time-invariant, and stabilizing unlike the results in [27, 33, 40, 41].
We note again that the optimality of linear policies for infinite horizon LQG problems is open
in its generality and we provide positive results for a class of such problems.
Average cost, infinite horizon, team problems with the one step delay sharing pattern
have not been fully addressed in the literature, despite the presence of results where finite-
ness of the state space and actions and additional technical assumptions on the information
structure and the cost function have been imposed [1]. In [24], under the assumption that
initial states and disturbances are independent, the state feedback optimal policy has been
obtained for finite horizon LQG team problems with a partially nested information structure
admitting delay and sparsity constraints [24]. This approach assumes full state feedback with
independent initial states and disturbances. The result has been extended to average cost infi-
nite horizon LQG problems where under some technical assumptions, the convergence of the
solution to the solution of the corresponding algebraic Riccati equations [24] has been shown;
however, global optimality of the limit solution has not been established. In this paper, we
establish global optimality.
Contributions. In view of the discussion above, our paper makes the following contri-
butions.
(i) We define the notion of exchangeable teams and symmetric information structures,
and we show that, for convex exchangeable dynamic teams with finite horizons,
optimal policies exhibit a symmetry structure (Theorem 2.7). For any number of
DMs, this symmetry structure is more relaxed when compared with the symmetry
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results developed in [35, 36] and is applicable for dynamic teams which may not
admit a static reduction, as long as convexity in policies holds for the team problem.
(ii) For convex mean-field teams with a symmetric information structure, through con-
centration of measure arguments, we establish the convergence of optimal polices
for mean-field teams with N decision makers to the corresponding optimal policies
for mean-field teams (see Theorem 3.2).
(iii) We establish an existence result for the class of convexmean-field teams with a sym-
metric information structure (see Theorem 3.3) for finite horizon problems, where,
as noted in the literature review, related results assumed more restrictive information
structures which are either static or classical.
(iv) We also apply our results to LQG dynamic teams for finite horizon problems (see
Section 4). For LQG dynamic teams with a symmetric partially information pattern,
we obtain an optimal policy for finite horizon problems (see Section 4.1). We also
apply convexmean-field results to LQGmean-field teams with a symmetric partially
nested information structure (see Section 4.1) and obtain a globally optimal policy.
Building on the result above, we also obtain a globally optimal policy for average
cost team problems with a symmetric partially nested. For LQG dynamic teams
with the one step delayed information structure, we show that under observability
and controllability conditions, a globally optimal policy for the average cost infinite
horizon problems can be obtained as the pointwise limit of the sequence of optimal
policies for finite horizon problems as T → ∞. Hence, we establish linearity of a
global optimal policy (see Theorem 4.13).
The organization of the paper is as follows: we study convex exchangeable dynamic
teams with finite horizons in Section 2, and we study mean-field teams in Section 3. We ob-
tain globally optimal solutions for finite horizon problems with a symmetric partially nested
information structure and LQG mean-field teams in Section 4.1, and we discuss average cost
LQG team problems with a symmetric information structure and with the one step delayed
sharing pattern and sparsity in Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.2.2, respectively.
1.1. Preliminaries. We first introduce preliminaries following the presentation in [49],
in particular, we introduce the characterizations laid out by Witsenhausen, through his Intrin-
sic Model [43]. Consider sequential systems and assume the action and measurement spaces
are standard Borel spaces, that is, Borel subsets of complete, separable and metric spaces.
The Intrinsic Model for sequential teams is defined as follows.
• There exists a collection of measurable spaces {(Ω,F), (Ui,U i), (Yi,Yi), i ∈ N},
specifying the system’s distinguishable events, and control and measurement spaces.
In this model (described in discrete time), any action applied at any given time is re-
garded as applied by an individual decision maker (DM), who acts only once. The
pair (Ω,F) is a measurable space (on which an underlying probability may be de-
fined). The pair (Ui,U i) denotes the measurable space from which the action, ui, of
DMi is selected. The pair (Yi,Yi) denotes the measurable observation/measurement
space.
• There is a measurement constraint to establish the connection between the observa-
tion variables and the system’s distinguishable events. The Yi-valued observation
variables are given by yi = hi(ω, u[1,i−1]), where u[1,i−1] = {uk, k ≤ i − 1},
his are measurable functions and uk denotes the action of DMk. Hence, yi induces
σ(yi) over Ω×
∏i−1
k=1 U
k.
• The set of admissible control laws γ = {γi}i∈N , also called designs or policies,
are measurable control functions, so that ui = γi(yi). Let Γi denote the set of all
admissible policies for DMi and let Γ =
∏
i∈N Γ
i.
• There is a probability measure P on (Ω,F) describing the probability space on
which the system is defined.
Under the intrinsic model, every DM acts separately. However, depending on the information
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structure, it may be convenient to consider a collection of DMs as a single DM acting at
different time instances. In fact, in classical stochastic control, this is the standard approach.
Notation. R and N denote the set of real numbers and natural numbers, respectively. We
denote trace of a matrix A as Tr(A). We denote that a random vectorX is independent of a
random vector Y byX |= Y . We denote AT as the transpose of a matrix A and A(T ) to show
the dependence of a matrix A to T ∈ N.
2. Finite horizon convex dynamic team problems with a symmetric information
structure. In this section, we characterize symmetry in dynamic team problems. According
to the discussion above, by considering a collection of DMs as a single DM (i = 1, . . . , N )
acting at different time instances (t = 0, . . . , T − 1), we redefine the team problem with
(NT )-DMs as a team with N -DMs:
(i) Let the observation spaces and action spaces be standard Borel spaces and be identical
for each DM (i = 1, . . . , N ) with Yi = Y =
∏T−1
k=0 Y
k, Ui = U =
∏T−1
k=0 U
k, respectively.
The sets of all admissible policies are denoted by Γ =
∏N
i=1 Γi =
∏N
i=1
∏T−1
t=0 Γ
t,
(ii) Let ω := (ζ1:N) := (ζ1, . . . , ζN ) where ζi denotes all the uncertainty asso-
ciated with DMi including his/her initial states, xi0 taking values in the space Ωζ . For
i = 1, . . . , N , yit := h
i
t(ζ
i, ζ−i, ui0:t−1, u
−i
0:t−1) represents the observation of DM
i at
time t (hit is Borel measurable) and ζ
−i := (ζ1, . . . , ζi−1, ζi+1, . . . , ζN) and u−i0:t−1 :=
(u10:t−1, . . . , u
i−1
0:t−1, u
i+1
0:t−1, . . . , u
N
0:t−1),
(iii) Let the expected cost function be defined as JT (γ
1:N
T
) = Eγ
1:N
T [c(ζ1:N , u1:N )],
for some Borel measurable cost function c : Ωζ ×
∏N
k=1 U → R+, where γ
1:N
T
=
(γ1
T
, γ2
T
, . . . , γN
T
) and γi
T
= γi0:T−1 for i = 1, . . . , N .
Now, we define the symmetric information structure (note that symmetric information
structures can be classical, partially nested, or non-classical).
DEFINITION 2.1. Let the information of DMi acting at time t be described as Iit := {y
i
t}.
The information structure of a sequentialN -DM team problem is symmetric if
(i) yit = ht(ζ
i, ζ−i, ui0:t−1, u
−i
0:t−1) where ht is identical for all i = 1, . . . , N .
We note that the above definition can be generalized to be applicable for teams with countably
infinite DMs and infinite horizon problems.
The symmetric information structure can also be interpreted and defined as a graph,
which has often been the common method to describe information structures in the control
theory, relating DMs and their information through directed edges. Consider G(V, µ) as a
directed graph with V = {1, . . . , NT } nodes and where µ ⊂ V × V determines the directed
edges between nodes; this represents the dependency notation in the information of nodes,
i.e., (i, j) denotes a directed edge from i to j, i → j, it means ui affects yj through the
relation yi = hi(ω, u[1,i−1]) defined in the intrinsic model (see Section 1.1). We denote by
↓ j as the set of nodes i such that i→ j (ancestors), and ↓↓ j = {↓ j}∪{j}. Similarly, we can
define descendants by ↑ j. We can define a collection of DMs as a single DM (i = 1, . . . , N )
acting at different time instances (t = 0, . . . , T − 1) on a graph with a symmetric information
structure (two examples are shown in Fig. 2.1, and Fig. 2.2). Assume
(i) there exists a node {i} (root node) that represents initial states of DMs and ω0 =
(x10, . . . , x
N
0 ). Each sub-graph represents a single DM acting at time instances t = 0, . . . , T−
1, and there exists a finite number of sub-graphsGp(Vˆ, µˆ) such that∪
N
p=1Gp∪{i} = G, where
Gps are isomorphic (see e.g., [42]) for all p = 1, . . . , N , i.e., for every node with directed
edges in each sub-graph there exists a unique node with identical directed edges in the cor-
responding sub-graphs, where Vˆ = {0, . . . , T − 1}, and Gkp refers to a node k in Gp for all
p = 1, . . . , N and k = 0, . . . , T − 1,
(ii) sharing of the information is symmetric across sub-graphs, i.e., for p, s = 1, . . . , N , and
k, j = 0, . . . , T − 1, and for every edge from a node Gkp to a node G
j
s, there exists an edge
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from a node Gkp to nodes G
j
−p , where G
j
−p denotes (G
j
1, . . . , G
j
p−1, G
j
p+1, . . . , G
j
N ), and
also there exist edges from nodes Gk−p to a nodeG
j
p.
We present an exchangeability hypothesis on the cost function. First, we recall the definition
of an exchangeable finite set of random variables.
DEFINITION 2.2. Random variables (vectors) x1, x2, . . . , xN defined on a com-
mon probability space are exchangeable if any permutation, σ, of the set {1, . . . , N}
does not change the joint probability measures of random variables (vectors), i.e.,
P(d(xσ)1, d(xσ)2, . . . , d(xσ)N ) = P(dx1, dx2, . . . , dxN ).
ASSUMPTION 2.1. Assume for any permutation σ ∈ Σ of the set {1, . . . , N}, where Σ
is the set of all possible permutations, we have P-almost surely,
c((ζσ)1:N , (uσ)1:N ) = c(ζ1:N , u1:N).(2.1)
Here, we recall some definitions and results from [49, Section 3.3] on convexity of static and
dynamic team problems required to follow the result in this paper.
DEFINITION 2.3. [49, Section 3.3] An N -DM team problem (static or dynamic) is con-
vex in policies if for any two team policies γ0:N
1,T
and γ0:N
2,T
in the set {γ0:N
T
∈ Γ : J(γ0:N
T
) <
∞}, and for any α ∈ (0, 1), we have
JT (αγ
0:N
1,T
+ (1 − α)γ0:N
2,T
) ≤ αJT (γ
0:N
1,T
) + (1− α)JT (γ
0:N
2,T
).
The above definition can also be applied to infinite-horizon and/or teams with countably
infinite number of DMs. We recall sufficient conditions for convexity of static and dynamic
team problems following [49, Section 3.3].
THEOREM 2.4. [49, Section 3.3] Consider a sequential team problems, and assume ac-
tion spaces are convex, and J(γ) <∞ for all γ ∈ Γ (or alternatively, restrict the set to those
leading to the finite cost). Then
(i) for static team problems, convexity of the cost function in actions, P-almost sure
convexity in u1:N of c(ζ1:N , u1:N ), is sufficient for convexity of the team problem in policies,
(ii) for dynamic team problems with a static reduction, convexity of the team problem in
policies is equivalent to the convexity of its static reduction.
(iii) in particular, for partially nested dynamic teams with a static reduction (more gen-
erally, for stochastically partially nested team problems [49, Section 3.3]) if the statically
reduced cost function is convex in actions then the team problem is convex on Γ.
The conditions above, however, are only sufficient conditions [49, Example 1]. We note
however that as a Corollary for (ii) above, for the LQG setup, under partial nestedness, con-
vexity in policies hold as a consequence of Radners theorem; we will study this case in
Section 4. On the other hand, not all LQG problems are convex: the celebrated counterexam-
ple of Witsenhausen [44] demonstrates that under non-classical information structures, even
LQG problems may not be convex and optimal policies may not be linear.
y10
y20
y11
y21
ω0
...
...
Fig. 2.1: A tree structure of a symmetric dynamic team.
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y10
y20
y11
y12
ω0
y13
y23
y21
y22
y24
y14
...
...
Fig. 2.2: An example of the graph structure of a symmetric dynamic team.
2.1. Optimality of symmetric policies for convex dynamic teams with a symmetric
information structure. In the following, we define notions of exchangeable and symmetri-
cally optimal teams analogous to [35, 36] for dynamic teams.
DEFINITION 2.5. (Exchangeable teams)
An N -DM team is exchangeable if the value of the expected cost function is invariant under
every permutation of policies of DMs, i.e., JT (γ
1
T
, γ2
T
, . . . , γN
T
) = JT ((γ
σ
T
)1, . . . , (γσ
T
)N ).
DEFINITION 2.6. (Symmetrically optimal teams)
A team is symmetrically optimal, if for every given policy γ
T
= (γ1
T
, . . . , γN
T
), there exists
an identically symmetric policy (i.e., each DM has the same policy, γ˜
T
= (γ˜1
T
, . . . , γ˜N
T
) , and
γ˜i
T
= γ˜j
T
for all i, j = 1, . . . , N ,) which performs at least as good as the given policy.
REMARK 1. The concepts of exchangeable and symmetrically optimal dynamic teams
in this paper are generalizations of those for static teams in [35, 36]. However, here, the
value of the cost function may not be invariant under exchanging γit with γ
j
k for k 6= t,
k, t = 0, . . . , T − 1, and for i, j = 1, . . . , N .
Here, we give a characterization for exchangeable and symmetrically optimal dynamic teams.
THEOREM 2.7. Consider a team problem with a symmetric information structure (see
Definition 2.1) under Assumption 2.1. If
(a) action spaces are convex for each DM,
(b) (ζ1, . . . , ζN ) are exchangeable,
(c) for all policies γ ∈ Γ,
T−1∏
t=0
P
(
dy1:Nt |ζ
1:N , y
↓↓(1:N)
↓t , γ
↓↓(1:N)
↓t (y
↓↓(1:N)
↓t )
)
=
T−1∏
t=0
N∏
i=1
P
(
dyit|ζ
i, y
↓↓i
↓t , γ
↓↓i
↓t (y
↓↓i
↓t )
)
,
(2.2)
where ↓↓ (1 : N) denotes (↓↓ 1, . . . , ↓↓ N) and y↓↓i↓t corresponds to the observations of
DMjs (including DMi itself) at time instances p where the action of DMjs at time p affects
the observation of DMi at time t (γ
↓↓(1:N)
↓t (y
↓↓(1:N)
↓t )) can be defined similarly),
(i) then, the team problem is exchangeable.
(ii) Furthermore, if the team problem is convex in policies (see Theorem 2.4), then the
team is symmetrically optimal.
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Proof. We first show that for any permutation σ ∈ Σ of policies
JT ((γ
σ
T
)1, . . . , (γσ
T
)N ) = JT (γ
1
T
, . . . , γN
T
), i.e., the team is exchangeable. We have,
JT
(
(γσ
T
)1, . . . , (γσ
T
)N
)
=
∫
c
(
ζ1:N , (γσ
T
)1(y1), . . . , (γσ
T
)N (yN )
)
P(dζ1:N )
T−1∏
t=0
N∏
i=1
P
(
dyit|ζ
i, y
↓↓i
↓t , (γ
σ)↓↓i↓t (y
↓↓i
↓t )
)(2.3)
=
∫
c
(
(ζσ)1:N , (γσ
T
)1((yσ)1), . . . , (γσ
T
)N ((yσ)N
)
P(d(ζσ)1:N )
(2.4)
×
T−1∏
t=0
N∏
i=1
P
(
d(yσ)it|(ζ
σ)i, (yσ)
↓↓i
↓t , (γ
σ)↓↓i↓t ((y
σ)↓↓i↓t )
)
=
∫
c
(
ζ1, . . . , ζN , γ1
T
(y1), . . . , γN
T
(yN )
)
P(dζ1:N )
T−1∏
t=0
N∏
i=1
P
(
dyit|ζ
i, y
↓↓i
↓t , γ
↓↓i
↓t (y
↓↓i
↓t )
)(2.5)
= JT (γ
1
T
, . . . , γ2
T
),
where (2.3) follows from Assumption (c). Equality (2.4) follows from exchanging yi, ζi
with (yσ)i, (ζσ)i by relabeling them, respectively. Since the information structure is sym-
metric, (2.1) and Assumption (b) imply (2.5). Hence, the team is exchangeable. Let
γ∗
T
= (γ1∗
T
, . . . , γN∗
T
) be a team optimal policy. Consider γ˜
T
as a convex combination of
all possible permutations of policies by averaging them. Since action spaces are convex, γ˜
T
is a control policy. Following from convexity of the cost function in policies, we have for∑
σ∈Σ ασ = 1, and ασ ∈ (0, 1),
JT (γ˜T ) := JT (
∑
σ∈Σ
ασγ
∗,σ
T
) ≤
∑
σ∈Σ
ασJT (γ
∗,σ
T
) = JT (γ
∗
T
),
where the inequality follows from the hypothesis that the team problem is convex on Γ and
the last equality follows from exchangeablity of the team problem. This implies that γ˜∗
T
is
team optimal and the dynamic team is symmetrically optimal.
Examples will be given in Section 4.1 where Theorem 2.7 can be applied. Here, we present
the result for the class of problems that admit a static reduction (see [48, Section 3.7], [49,
Section 1.2], [17, 45]).
LEMMA 2.8. Consider a dynamic team problem with a symmetric partially nested in-
formation structure (see Definition 2.1) which admits a static reduction. Under Assumption
2.1, and Assumptions (a), (b), (c) of Theorem 2.7, if the cost function is jointly convex on
u1, . . . , uN P-almost surely, then the team is symmetrically optimal.
We note that here by symmetry we mean symmetry across the decision makers.
Proof. The proof follows from Theorem 2.4(iii) and Theorem 2.7 since the team is con-
vex on Γ.
It follows that if a static reduction of an exchangeable, symmetrically optimal, dynamic team
exists, then it is exchangeable and symmetrically optimal.
3. Convex mean-field teams with a symmetric information structure. In the follow-
ing, we establish global optimality results for convex mean-field teams with a symmetric
information structure (that are not necessarily partially nested).
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Problem (PN,MFT ): Consider the expected cost function for N -DM teams defined as
JNT (γ
N
T
) =
1
N
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
E
γ1:N
T [c(xit, u
i
t,
1
N
N∑
p=1
u
p
t ,
1
N
N∑
p=1
x
p
t )],(3.1)
where γ1:N
T
= γ1:N0:T−1, and the cost function satisfies the following assumption.
ASSUMPTION 3.1. The cost function, c : X × U × U × X → R+, is continuous in all it’s
arguments, where X, U denote the state space and action space of DMs at all time instances.
Problem (P∞,MFT ): Consider the expected cost for mean-field teams as
J∞T (γT ) = lim sup
N→∞
JNT (γT ),(3.2)
where JNT (·) is defined in (3.1), γ
i
T
= γi0:T−1 for i ∈ N, and γT = {γ
i
T
}i∈N. Let
xit+1 = ft(x
i
t, u
i
t, w
i
t),(3.3)
yit = ht(x
i
0:t, u
i
↓t, v
i
0:t),(3.4)
where functions ft and ht are measurable functions. The information structure for DM
i at
time t is Iit = {y
i
t} for i ∈ N and t = 0, . . . , T − 1, and ζ
i
t := (w
i
t, v
i
t) (with ζ
i
0 :=
(xi0, w
i
t, v
i
t)) denotes uncertainty corresponding to dynamics and observations at time t for
DM i which are exogenous random vectors in the standard Borel space
ASSUMPTION 3.2. Functions ft and ht are continuous in the state and actions.
3.1. Mean-field optimal policies as limits of optimalN -DM teams.
ASSUMPTION 3.3. Assume
(i) ω0 := {xi0}i∈N are exchangeable zero mean random vectors with an identical dis-
tribution (not necessarily independent),
(ii) for t = 0, . . . , T − 1, {wit}i∈N are i.i.d. zero mean random vectors, and for i ∈ N,
{wit}
T−1
t=0 are mutually independent, and independent of ω0. For t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
{vit}i∈N are i.i.d. zero mean random vectors, and for i ∈ N, {v
i
t}
T−1
t=0 are mutually
independent, and independent of ω0, and w
i
ts for i ∈ N and t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
LEMMA 3.1. Consider a team defined as (PN,MFT ) (see (3.1)) with a symmetric informa-
tion structure. Assume the problem is convex in policies. Let the action space be compact and
convex for each decision makers. Under Assumption 3.1, Assumption 3.2, and Assumption
3.3 for i = 1, . . . , N , the team is symmetrically optimal.
Proof. The proof follows from Theorem 2.7.
THEOREM 3.2. Consider a team defined as (P∞,MFT ) (see (3.2)) with (P
N,MF
T ) having
a symmetric information structure for every N . Assume for every N the team is convex
in policies. Let the action space be compact and convex for each DM. Under Assumption
3.1, Assumption 3.2, and Assumption 3.3, if there exists a sequence of optimal policies for
(PN,MFT ), {γ
∗,N
T
}N , which converges (for every DM due to the symmetry) pointwise to γ∗,∞T
as N →∞, then γ∗,∞
T
(which is identically symmetric) is an optimal policy for (P∞,MFT ).
Proof. Following from Lemma 3.1, one can consider a sequence ofN -DM teams which
are symmetrically optimal that defines (PN,MFT ) and whose limit is identified with (P
∞,MF
T ).
Define
QωN (B) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δωβi
N
(B) where βiN := (γ
∗,N
T
(yi), yi, ζi),(3.5)
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Q˜ωN (B) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δωβi
∞
(B) where βi∞ := (γ
∗,∞
T
(yi), yi, ζi),
where δωY (·) denotes Dirac measure for any random vector Y , and B ∈ Z := U ×
Y × S, U := (
∏T−1
k=0 U), Y := (
∏T−1
k=0 Y), S := (
∏T−1
k=0 S) = (
∏T−1
k=0 W× V),
yi = (yi0, . . . , y
i
T−1) for all i ∈ N, and ζ
i := (ζi0, . . . , ζ
i
T−1).
In the following, first, we show that QωN converges P-almost surely to Q
ω in w-s topol-
ogy (coarsest topology onP(U×Y×S) (P(·) denotes the set of probability measures) under
which
∫
f(u, y, ζ)QωN(du, dy, dζ) : P(U×Y×S)→ R is continuous for every measurable
and bounded f which is continuous in u and y but need not to be continous in ζ (see e.g., [38]
and [47, Theorem 5.6]), then we show
lim sup
N→∞
JNT (γ˜
∗,N
T
) = J∞T (γ˜
∗,∞
T
),
where γ˜∗,N
T
:= (γ∗,N
T
, γ∗,N
T
, . . . , γ∗,N
T
), and γ˜∗,∞
T
:= (γ∗,∞
T
, γ∗,∞
T
, . . . ).
(Step 1): In this step, we show that QωN converges P-almost surely to Q
ω in w-s topol-
ogy. For every ω0 = (x
1
0, . . . , x
N
0 ), we have for every continuous and bounded function g in
actions and observations, by the strong law of large numbers,
P
(
{ω ∈ Ω| lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
g(γ∗,N
T
(yi), yi, ζi)− g(γ∗,∞
T
(yi), yi, ζi)
∣∣∣∣∣ = 0}
∣∣ω0
)
= 1,
(3.6)
where (3.6) follows from the definition of empirical measures and the fact that ζi are i.i.d.,
conditioned on ω0, y
i are i.i.d. random vectors, and every DM applies an identical policy (this
follows from symmetry of the information structure and Lemma 3.1 since every DM applies
the identical policy γ∗,N
T
, and functions f and h are identical for each DM), and since g is
continuous and bounded in actions and observations, by the dominated convergence theorem,
lim
N→∞
E
(
g(γ∗,N
T
(y1), y1, ζ1)− g(γ∗,∞
T
(y1), y1, ζ1)
)
= 0.(3.7)
Hence, we have, P
(
{ω ∈ Ω| lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∫ gdQωN − ∫ gdQ˜ωN ∣∣∣ = 0}) = 1. Now, we show that,
{Q˜ωN}N converges P-almost surely weakly to Q
ω. Let
L(γ∗,∞
T
(yi), yi, ζi) := g(γ∗,∞
T
(yi), yi, ζi)− E(g(γ∗,∞
T
(y1), y1, ζ1)).
Since conditioned on ω0, (γ
∗,∞
T
(yi), yi, ζi) are i.i.d. random vectors by the strong law of
large numbers, we have for every ω0,
P
(
{ω ∈ Ω| lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
L(γ∗,∞
T
(yi), yi, ζi)
∣∣∣∣∣ = 0}∣∣ω0
)
= 1,
hence, P
(
{ω ∈ Ω| lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∫ gdQ˜ωN − ∫ gdQω∣∣∣ = 0}) = 1. Hence, for a set of P-measure
one, for every g continous and bounded in actions and observations (and measurable and
bounded in uncertainty and initial states)
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣
∫
gdQωN −
∫
gdQω
∣∣∣∣≤ limN→∞
( ∣∣∣∣
∫
gdQωN −
∫
gdQ˜ωN
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣
∫
gdQ˜ωN −
∫
gdQω
∣∣∣∣
)
= 0,
and QωN converges P-almost surely weakly to Q
ω. We note that the convergence is weakly,
but since ζis are exogenouswith a fixedmarginal, the convergence is also in thew-s topology.
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(Step 2): Following from Assumption 3.2, we have
xit = ft−1(ft−2(. . . f0(x
i
0, u
i
0, w
i
0)), u
i
t−1, w
i
t−1) = f˜t−1(x
i
0, ζ
i, ui0:t),
yit = ht(f˜0(x
i
0, ζ
i, ui0), . . . , f˜t−1(x
i
0, ζ
i, ui0:t), u
i
↓t, v
i
0:t−1) = h˜t(x
i
0, ζ
i, ui0:t),
where f˜t−1 and h˜t are continuous in actions, and since the cost function is continuous in its
argument, we have
1
N
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=0
E
γ∗,1:N
T [c(xit, u
i
t,
1
N
N∑
p=1
u
p
t ,
1
N
N∑
p=1
x
p
t )]
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[
c˜
(
ω0, ζ
i, γ∗,N
T
(yi),
1
N
N∑
i=1
γ∗,N
T
(yi),
1
N
N∑
i=1
Λ(yi, xi0, ζ
i)
)]
,(3.8)
where (3.8) is true for some P-almost sure, c˜ non-negative and continuous in its last three
arguments, and a function Λ continuous in yi. Hence, by induction and by rewriting obser-
vations as a functions of policies of the past DMs (γi↓t(y
i
↓t)) if γ
∗,N
T
converges to γ∗,∞
T
, then
the induced cost by γ∗,N
T
also converges to the cost induced by γ∗,∞
T
P-almost surely.
(Step 3): We have
lim sup
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=0
E
γ∗,1:N
T [c(xit, u
i
t,
1
N
N∑
p=1
u
p
t ,
1
N
N∑
p=1
x
p
t )]
= lim sup
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[
c˜
(
ω0, ζ
i, γ∗,N
T
(yi),
1
N
N∑
i=1
γ∗,N
T
(yi),
1
N
N∑
i=1
Λ(yi, xi0, ζ
i)
)](3.9)
≥ lim inf
N→∞
∫
Ω
∫
Z
c˜
(
ω0, ζ, u,
∫
U
uQωN (du×Y × S),
∫
Y×S
ΛQωN(U × dy × dζ)
)(3.10)
×QωN (du, dy, dζ)P(dω)
≥
∫
Ω
lim inf
N→∞
∫
Z
c˜
(
ω0, ζ, u,
∫
U
uQωN (du×Y × S),
∫
Y×S
ΛQωN(U × dy × dζ)
)(3.11)
×QωN (du, dy, dζ)P(dω)
≥
∫
Ω
∫
Z
c˜
(
ω0, ζ, u,
∫
U
uQω(du ×Y × S),
∫
Y×S
ΛQω(U × dy × dζ)
)
Qω(du, dy, dζ)P(dω),
(3.12)
where (3.9) is true from (Step 2). Inequality (3.10) follows from the definition of QωN and
by replacing limsup by liminf, and (3.11) follows from Fatou’s lemma. In the following, we
justify (3.12). SinceQωN convergesP-almost surely weakly toQ
ω, we haveQωN(du×Y×S)
convergesP-almost surely weakly to Qω(du×Y×S), hence the compactness ofU implies
P-almost surely
(3.13)
1
N
N∑
i=1
γ∗,N
T
(yi) =
∫
U
uQωN(du×Y×S)
N→∞
−−−−→
∫
U
uQω(du×Y×S) = E(γ∗,∞
T
(y1)|ω0).
Since given ω0, (y
i, xi0, ζ
i)s are i.i.d., hence, using the law of iterated expectations and the
law of large numbers, we can show that P-almost surely∫
Y×S
ΛQωN(U× dy × dζ)
N→∞
−−−−→
∫
Y×S
ΛQω(U× dy × dζ).
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Since the cost function is P-almost sure continuous in its last three arguments, P-almost
surely
lim
N→∞
c˜
(
ω0, ζ, u,
∫
U
uQωN(du ×Y × S),
∫
Y×S
ΛQωN(U× dy × dζ)
)
= c˜
(
ω0, ζ, u,
∫
U
uQω(du×Y × S),
∫
Y×S
ΛQω(U× dy × dζ)
)
.
Define a non-negative bounded sequence
GMN := min{M,c˜
(
ω0, ζ, u,
∫
U
uQωN(du×Y × S),
∫
Y×S
ΛQωN (U× dy × dζ)
)
},
where the sequence {GNM}M converges asM →∞ to
GN := c˜
(
ω0, ζ, u,
∫
U
uQωN(du ×Y × S),
∫
Y×S
ΛQωN(U× dy × dζ)
)
,
then we have P-almost surely
lim inf
N→∞
∫
Z
c˜
(
ω0, ζ, u,
∫
U
uQωN(du×Y × S),
∫
Y×S
ΛQωN(U× dy × dζ)
)
QωN (du, dy, dζ)
= lim
M→∞
lim inf
N→∞
∫
Z
c˜
(
ω0, ζ, u,
∫
U
uQωN(du ×Y × S),
∫
Y×S
ΛQωN(U× dy × dζ)
)
×QωN(du, dy, dζ)
≥ lim
M→∞
lim inf
N→∞
∫
Z
GMN Q
ω
N (du, dy.dζ)
= lim
M→∞
∫
Z
GMQω(du, dy, dζ)
=
∫
Z
c˜
(
ω0, ζ, u,
∫
U
uQω(du×Y × S),
∫
Y×S
ΛQω(U× dy × dζ)
)
Qω(du, dy, dζ),
where the inequality follows from the definition of GMN and the second equality is true using
[39, Theorem 3.5] or [25, Theorem 3.1] since GMN is bounded (hence is uniformly Q
ω
N -
integrable) and continuously converges to GM , and the monotone convergence theorem im-
plies the last equality. Hence, (3.12) holds which implies lim sup
N→∞
JNT (γ˜
∗,N
T
) = J∞T (γ˜
∗,∞
T
),
and this completes the proof following from [35, Theorem 5]. Here, for completeness we
present the proof which is similar to the analysis of the proof [35, Theorem 5] for dynamic
teams,
inf
γ
T
J∞T (γT ) ≤ lim sup
N→∞
JNT (γ˜
∗,∞
T
)
= lim sup
N→∞
JNT (γ
∗,N
T
) = lim sup
N→∞
inf
γ0:N
T
JNT (γ
0:N
T
)
= lim sup
N→∞
inf
γ
T
JNT (γT )(3.14)
≤ inf
γ
T
lim sup
N→∞
JNT (γT ) = infγ
T
J∞(γ
T
),
where (3.14) is true since the restriction γ
T
to N first components is γ0:N
T
. This implies that
γ˜∗,∞
T
is globally optimal.
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REMARK 2. On the connection between finitely many DMs and infinitely many DMs, we
note that a closely related work on mean-field games by Fischer [14] where the information
structure is assumed to be static since the strategy of each player is assumed to be adapted
to the filtration generated by his/her initial states and Wiener process (also called in the
mean-field games literature, somewhat non-standard in the control literature, as open-loop
distributed controllers [21],[13, pages 72-76]). This means that the information of each DM
is not affected by any of the actions of the other DMs. For dynamic teams, there are two
difficulties: (i) obtaining variational equations is challenging since fixing policies of DMs
and perturbing only one DM’s policies, perturbs the observation of other DMs and hence
the controls u−i∗ = (γ1(y1), . . . , γi−1∗(yi−1), γi+1∗(yi+1), . . . , γN∗(yN )), (ii) solutions
of variational equations which give person-by-person optimal policies are inconclusive for
global optimality due to the lack of convexity in general since convexity of the cost function
in (u1, . . . , uN) does not necessarily imply the convexity of the team problem in policies,
hence person-by-person optimality does not necessarily imply global optimality (for sufficient
conditions for convexity in policies see Theorem 2.4).
REMARK 3. We also note additional related works by Lacker [22, 23] where either con-
vergence of open-loop controllers, or convergence of Nash equilibria induced by closed-
loop controllers (where controls are measurable path-dependents functions of states, uit =
φ(t,X0:t), where X0:t = (X
1
0:t, . . . , X
N
0:t) and φ is a measurable function) or Markovian
controllers (uit = φ(t,Xt), where Xt = (X
1
t , . . . , X
N
t )) have been considered. In [23], the
information structure is classical (hence, a centralized problem since players have access to
all the information available).
REMARK 4. In Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, we considered a non-classical information
structure for teams defined as (P∞,MFT ) (see (3.2)) with a convex expected cost in policies. For
teams defined as (P∞,MFT ) (see (3.2)) with a symmetric partially information structure which
admits static reduction, the above result holds and similar to the proof of Theorem 3.2, it can
be proven under the assumption that the cost functions is convex in actions (since convexity of
the cost function in actions is a sufficient condition for convexity of the expected cost function
in policies for this class of problems [49, Theorem 3.7])
REMARK 5. Analogous to [35, Theorem 9], we can relax the hypothesis that action
spaces are compact; by assuming that
(A1) sup
N≥1
E(|γ∗,N
T
(y1)− γ∗,∞
T
(y1)|1+δ) <∞ for some δ > 0,
since the above uniform integrability justifies exchanging the limit and the expectation re-
quired to establish the convergence in (3.13). This result is particularly important for LQG
models (we use this remark in Section 4).
3.2. An existence theorem on globally optimal policies for dynamic mean-field team
problems with a symmetric information structure. An implication of Theorem 3.2 is the
following existence result on globally optimal policies for mean-field problems. In particular,
we will establish the existence of a converging subsequence, in an appropriate sense, for a
sequence of optimal policies for finite teams with an increasing number of DMs. For the
following theorem, we do not establish the pointwise convergence; but by Theorem 3.2, if a
sequence of optimal policies for (PN,MFT ), {γ
∗,N
T
}N , converges pointwise, a global optimal
policy exists. To this end, we allow decision makers for (P∞,MFT ) to apply randomized
policies. In fact, for each decision maker (DMi for i ∈ N), a probability measure P ∈
P(X ×
∏T−1
t=0 (W × V) ×
∏T−1
t=0 (U × Y)) is a strategic measure induced by a randomized
policy if and only if for every t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
∫
g(xi0, ζ
i
0:t−1, y
i
0:t, u
i
0:t)P (dx
i
0, dζ
i
0:t−1, dy
i
0:t, du
i
0:t)
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=∫
g(xi0, ζ
i
0:t−1, y
i
0:t, u
i
0:t)(3.15)
×
t∏
k=0
Πik(du
i
k|y
i
k)p
i
k(dy
i
k|x
i
0, ζ
i
0:t−1, y
i
0:k−1, u
i
0:k−1)µ
i(dxi0, dζ
i
0:t−1),
for some stochastic kernel Πik on U given Y, for all continuous and bounded g, where p
i
k is
the transition kernel characterizing the observations of DMi at time t,
pik(y
i
k ∈ ·|x
i
0, ζ
i
0:t−1, y
i
0:k−1, u
i
0:k−1) := P
(
(ht(x
i
0:t, u
i
↓t, v
i
0:t)) ∈ ·|x
i
0, ζ
i
0:t−1, y
i
0:k−1, u
i
0:k−1
)
,
and µi is a fixed probability measure on initial states and disturbances. This equivalency fol-
lows from the fact that continuous and bounded functions form a separating class [7, page
12] and [46, Theorem 2.2] (for a detailed discussion on sets of strategic measures for decen-
tralized control, see [46, Section 2]).
First, we present an absolute continuity assumption on observations of DMs.
ASSUMPTION 3.4. for every DMi, and for every t = 0, . . . , T−1, there exists a function
ψit : Y × X ×
∏t−1
k=0(W × V) ×
∏t−1
k=0 U → R+ and a probability measure ν
i
t ∈ P(Y) such
that the following absolute continuity condition holds
pit(dy
i
t|x
i
0, ζ
i
0:t−1, y
i
0:t−1, u
i
0:t−1) = ψ
i
k(y
i
k, x
i
0, ζ
i
0:t−1, y
i
0:t−1, u
i
0:t−1)ν
i
k(dy
i
t).(3.16)
This assumption lets us obtain an independent measurements reduction (see [47, Section
2.2]). For example, assume actions spaces, observations spaces, disturbances spaces, and
initial states spaces are Euclidean spaces of appropriate dimensions and assume vit for all
i ∈ N and t = 0, . . . , T − 1, is i.i.d with a probability measure admitting a density function
so that the observation of each DMi at time t is yit = h˜t(x
i
t, u
i
↓t)+ v
i
t, where h˜t is continuous
in its arguments, then Assumption 3.4 holds [15, Lemma 5.1].
THEOREM 3.3. Consider a team defined as (P∞,MFT ) (see (3.2)) with (P
N,MF
T ) having
a symmetric information structure for every N . Assume for every N the team is convex in
policies, and action spaces are convex. Assume further that, U :=
∏T−1
t=0 U = ∪lKl for
a countable collection of compact sets Kl (i.e., U is σ-compact) and without any loss, the
control laws can be restricted to those with E(φi(u
i)) ≤ K for some finite K , where φi :
U → R+ is lower semi-continuous and satisfies lim
l→∞
inf
ui 6∈Kl
φi(u
i) = ∞, Under Assumption
3.1, Assumption 3.2 and Assumption 3.3 if either
(i) Assumption 3.4 holds (with no further assumptions on the information structure of
each DMi for i ∈ N through time t = 0, . . . , T − 1), or
(ii) For each DMi for i ∈ N through time t = 0, . . . , T−1, there exists a static reduction
with the classical information structure (i.e., under the reduction, the information
structure is expanding such that σ(yit) ⊂ σ(y
i
t+1) for t = 0, . . . , T − 1),
then there exists an optimal policy for (P∞,MFT ).
Since the space of strategic measures that are deterministic are not closed under weak
convergence (e.g., as an implication of [49, Theorem 2.7]), we allow for randomization in the
policies and therefore the optimal limit policy is not necessarily deterministic according to
the above result; however, it is identical for each DM.
Proof. We will develop a strategic measures approach by considering the probability
measures on the product space induced by admissible team policies. In particular, we will
show that for every optimal finite-time policy sequence, there exists a subsequence which
converges to an optimal strategic measure for the mean-field limit under an appropriate topol-
ogy defined by the product topology where each coordinate is endowed with the weak con-
vergence (i.e., that induced by the Prohorov metric). We first show that for each finite team
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problem, optimal policies are deterministic and symmetric and we will consider the strate-
gic measures induced by such policies as our sequence to be studied. Then, we show that
there exists a subsequence of optimal policies of N -DMs converges to an optimal policy of
(P∞,MFT ). However, we need to ensure that the limit is admissible and satisfies the required
measurability/conditional independence constraints. We define
QωN(B) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δω
βi
N
(B) where βiN := (γ
∗,N
T
(yi), yi, ζi),
where δωY (·) denotes Dirac measure for any random vector Y , and B ∈ Z . In (Step 2) and
(Step 3), we show that the set of strategic measures is weakly compact for each DM and also
there exists a subsequence {Qωn}n (where n ∈ I is the index set of a convergent subsequence)
converges P-almost surely in w-s topology. Then, we show that an induced policy by the
limit of a subsequence of empirical measures is globally optimal.
(Step 1): Under Assumption 3.1, Assumption 3.2 and Assumption 3.3, and following
from condition (i) using [47, Theorem 5.2], or condition (ii) using [47, Theorem 5.6], there
exists a deterministic optimal policy for each finite team problem. Action spaces are convex
and the team problem is convex in policies and following from the hypothesis that yis are
i.i.d. random variables given ω0, and the result of Lemma 3.1, one can consider a sequence
of N -DM teams which are symmetrically optimal that defines (PN,MFT ) and whose limit is
identified with (P∞,MFT ). Hence, for each finite team problem, we consider the strategic
measures induced by symmetric optimal policies.
(Step 2): In the following, we show that for some converging subsequence {Qωn}n∈I
convergesP-almost surely toQω inw-s topology, that is, for a set of P-measure one, for every
continuous and bounded function g in actions and observations and bounded and measurable
in uncertainty,
lim
n→∞
∣∣∣∣
∫
gdQωn −
∫
gdQω
∣∣∣∣ = 0,
where n ∈ I is the index set of a convergent subsequence. We use the fact that conditioned
on ω0, (γ
∗,N
T
(yi), yi, ζi) are i.i.d. random vectors (this follows from symmetry of the infor-
mation structure and Lemma 3.1 since every DM applies the identical policy γ∗,N
T
) and also
since the space of control policies is relatively compact under weak convergence for each DM
(see e.g., [47, proof of Theorem 4.7]).
To this end, first, we represent the policy spaces with probability measures P ∈ P(Y ×
U) for each DM [49, 9] satisfying (3.15), then we show that these set of probability measures
are relatively compact, hence, QωN is induced by these strategic measures is also relatively
compact. Since actions of DMs do not affect the observations of others, the policy spaces
are decoupled from the actions of other decision makers, and following from the hypothesis
on φi and the fact that ν →
∫
ν(dx)g(x) is lower semi-continuous for a continuous function
g [47, proof of Theorem 4.7], the marginals on U will be relatively compact under weak
convergence. If the marginals are relatively compact, then the collection of all measures
with these relatively compact marginals are also relatively compact (see e.g., [46, Proof of
Theorem 2.4]) and hence the control policy space is relatively compact. Following from the
information structure and Lemma 3.1 since every DM applies an identical policy, for every
observation, there is a different action where marginals of the product space of observations
and actions on the countably infinite product of these actions are relatively compact under
weak convergence, hence this implies that there exists a subsequence of strategic measures
P˜n ∈ P(
∏
i(Y ×U)) (as a product of strategic measures for each DM) converges P-almost
sure weakly to the limit P .
Furthermore, following from the information structure and Lemma 3.1 since every DM
applies an identical policy, conditioned onω0, observations of DMs are i.i.d., and disturbances
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are also i.i.d., hence, there exists a subsequence of empirical measures {Qωn}n∈I (defined in
the product space of actions, observations, and disturbances) converges P-almost surely to
Qω in w-s topology (the convergence is weakly, but since ζis are exogenous with a fixed
marginal, the convergence is also in the w-s topology).
(Step 3): In this step, we show that each coordinate of the space of policies (space of
polices for each DM) is closed under the weak convergence topology. This in particular
implies that the space of policies is closed under product topology and since using (Step
1) and Tychonoff’s theorem, the countably infinite product space is also compact under the
product topology, we can conclude that the space of control actions is compact under the
product topology where each coordinate is weakly compact.
Assume Pn is a strategic measure for DM
i induced by a randomized policy converging
weakly to P . We need to show that conditions (i) or (ii) leads to closedness of the set of
strategic measures (see (3.15)) induced by Pn. If Assumption 3.4 holds, then by lower semi-
continuity property of φi, and following from the discussion in the proof of [47, Theorem
5.2], each coordinate of policy spaces corresponds to DMi at time t is closed under the weak
convergence topology. Also, if condition (ii) holds, then [47, Theorem 5.6] leads to the same
conclusion. Hence, each coordinate of space of policies (corresponds to DMi) is closed under
the weak convergence topology (since each coordinate of the space of policies is finite product
of space of policies for each DM at time instances t = 0, . . . , T − 1). Hence, following from
(Step 2), there exists a subsequence {Qωn}n∈I convergesP-almost surely weakly toQ
ω where
Qω is induced by a randomized policy in the set of strategic measures satisfying (3.15) and the
limit policy is admissible and satisfies the required measurability/conditional independence
constraints.
(Step 4): Now, we show that the expected cost function under the induced policy ofQω
is less than or equal to the expected cost achieved by lim sup
n→∞
JnT (γ˜
∗,n
T
). Following from a
similar argument of (Step 2) of the proof of Theorem 3.2, (3.8) holds for some c˜ continuous
in its last three arguments. We have
∫
Ω
∫
Z
c˜
(
ω0, ζ, u,
∫
U
uQω(du×Y × S),
∫
Y×S
ΛQω(U× dy × dζ)
)
Qω(du, dy, dζ)P(dω)
= lim
M→∞
∫
Ω
∫
Z
min{M,c˜
(
ω0, ζ, u,
∫
U
uQω(du ×Y × S),
∫
Y×S
ΛQω(U× dy × dζ)
)
}
(3.17)
×Qω(du, dy, dζ)P(dω)
= lim
M→∞
∫
Ω
lim
n→∞
∫
Z
min{M,c˜
(
ω0, ζ, u,
∫
U
uQωn(du×Y × S),
∫
Y×S
ΛQωn(U× dy × dζ)
)
}
(3.18)
×Qωn(du, dy, dζ)P(dω)
= lim
M→∞
lim
n→∞
∫
Ω
∫
Z
min{M,c˜
(
ω0, ζ, u,
∫
U
uQωn(du×Y × S),
∫
Y×S
ΛQωn(U× dy × dζ)
)
}
(3.19)
×Qωn(du, dy, dζ)P(dω)
≤ lim
M→∞
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Ω
∫
Z
min{M,c˜
(
ω0, ζ, u,
∫
U
uQωN(du ×Y × S),
∫
Y×S
ΛQωN(U× dy × dζ)
)
}
(3.20)
×QωN (du, dy, dζ)P(dω)
≤ lim sup
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=0
E
γ∗,1:N
T [c(xit, u
i
t,
1
N
N∑
p=1
u
p
t ,
1
N
N∑
p=1
x
p
t )],
(3.21)
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where (3.17) follows from the monotone convergence theorem. Since {QωN}n∈I converges
P-almost surely weakly to Qω, we have
∫
U
uQωN (du ×Y × S) →
∫
U
uQω(du ×Y × S)
P-almost surely. Hence, (3.18) follows from [39, Theorem 3.5] since
min{M,c˜
(
ω0, ζ, u,
∫
U
uQωn(du×Y × S),
∫
Y×S
ΛQωn(U× dy × dζ)
)
}
is bounded and non-negative, and continuously converges in u P-almost surely, i.e., P-almost
surely
lim
n→∞
min{M, c˜
(
ω0, ζ, un,
∫
U
uQωn(du×Y × S),
∫
Y×S
ΛQωn(U × dy × dζ)
)
}
= min{M, c˜
(
ω0, ζ, u,
∫
U
uQω(du×Y × S),
∫
Y×S
ΛQω(U× dy × dζ)
)
},
where un → u as n → ∞. That is because, thanks to the symmetry, conditioned on ω0, yi
are i.i.d. random vectors, the space of policies is compact under the product topology (with
the weak convergence topology for each coordinate (for each DM)), and the cost function
is continuous. Equality (3.19) follows from the dominated convergence theorem, and (3.20)
is true since limsup is the greatest convergent subsequence limit for a bounded sequence.
Finally, (3.21) follows from the definition of empirical measures and since P-almost surely
min{M, c˜
(
ω0, ζ, u,
∫
U
uQω(du ×Y × S),
∫
Y×S
ΛQω(U × dy × dζ)
)
}
≤ c˜
(
ω0, ζ, u,
∫
U
uQω(du ×Y × S),
∫
Y×S
ΛQω(U× dy × dζ)
)
.
Hence, the proof is completed.
REMARK 6. For the existence result, to show that the set of strategic measures induced
by independent randomized policies for each DM through time t = 0, . . . , T − 1 (see (3.15))
is closed under the weak convergence topology, we utilized the result of [47, Section 5.2]
which are more general than those in [15, 49]. We note that the extension of the existence
results in [47, Section 5.2] to our setup is not obvious since the conclusion of (Step 3) can not
be made rigorously without considering the technical steps involving infinite dimensions and
limit arguments.
4. Symmetric LQG dynamic teams. In the section, we consider LQG setup where the
results of Section 2 and Section 3 can be applied. Also, we consider infinite horizon problems.
In the following subsection, we consider the LQG setup where Theorem 2.7 can be utilized.
4.1. Symmetric partially nested LQG dynamic teams on a graph. In the following,
we consider decentralized problems where Theorem 2.7 can be utilized and the optimal pol-
icy can be obtained. First, we formulate LQG problems with a symmetric partially nested
information pattern. Consider the following dynamics. Let i = 1, 2, and
(4.1) xit+1 = Ax
i
t +Bu
i
t + w
i
t,
where E(x10(x
2
0)
T ) 6= 0.
Problem (PT ): Consider the expected cost function
JT (γ
1
T
, γ2
T
) = E(γ
1
T
,γ2
T
)[
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
2∑
i=1
(xit)
TQxit + (u
i
t)
TRuit + (u
1
t )
T R˜u2t + (u
2
t )
T R˜u1t ],
(4.2)
where γi
T
= (γi0:T−1) for i = 1, 2, and R, R˜ > 0 and Q ≥ 0. Assume the information for
each decision maker is Iit = {y
i
t, y
i
↓t}, where y
i
t = Htζ
i+
∑T−1
j=0 Dtju
i
j , ζ
i = (xi0, w
i
0:T−1).
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In the following, we show that the above dynamic teams are symmetrically optimal under
sufficient conditions on the observations and initial states.
COROLLARY 4.1. For a fixed T , consider a finite horizon team problem defined above
as (PT ) (see (4.2)). If x10 and x
2
0 are exchangeable zero mean Gaussian random vectors and
wits are i.i.d. Gaussian random vectors for i = 1, 2, and independent for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1
and also independent of initial states, then the dynamic team is symmetrically optimal.
Proof. Since the dynamic team is LQG with partially nested information structure, static
reduction exists and the cost is convex in policies under a static reduction [16] and Theorem
2.4(iii). Assumption 2.1 is satisfied following from(4.2). In the following, we show assump-
tions of Theorem 2.7 hold. Follows from the hypothesis that disturbances are independent
random vectors and also independent of initial states, and the assumption that x10 and x
2
0 are
exchangeable and the hypothesis that wits for i = 1, 2 are i.i.d., we have Assumption (b)
holds. Assumption (c) holds following from Assumption 2.7 and since given ω0, (y
1
0:T−1), is
mutually independent of (y20:T−1). Hence, Theorem 2.7 completes the proof.
Here, we consider a class of LQG dynamic teams with symmetric partially nested information
structure. The information structure satisfying a tree structure where we utilize Corollary 4.1
and we obtain an explicit recursion for the optimal policy. Define the problem as follows:
Problem (P treeT ): Consider a finite horizon expected cost (4.2) with the information of each
DM is defined as Iit = {x
i
[0:t], u
i
[0:t−1]}.
THEOREM 4.2. For a fixed T , consider a finite horizon team problem defined as (P treeT )
(see (4.2)). If (x10, x
2
0) are exchangeable with an identical zero mean Gaussian distribution
and wits are i.i.d. zero mean Gaussian random vectors for i = 1, 2 and independent for all
t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and independent of initial states, then
u
1∗,(T )
t = K
(T )
t x
1
t + L
(T )
t E(x
2
0|x
1
0),(4.3)
u
2∗,(T )
t = K
(T )
t x
2
t + L
(T )
t E(x
1
0|x
2
0),(4.4)
where
K
(T )
t = −(R+B
TP
(T )
t+1B)
−1BTP
(T )
t+1A,(4.5)
P
(T )
t = −A
TP
(T )
t+1B
T (R+BTP
(T )
t+1B)
−1BTP
(T )
t+1A+Q +A
TP
(T )
t+1A,(4.6)
L
(T )
t = −(R+B
TP
(T )
t+1B)
−1[R˜K
(T )
t G
(T )
t + R˜L
(T )
t Σ(4.7)
+
T−1∑
s=t+1
BT (AT )s−tP
(T )
s+1BL
(T )
s ],
G
(T )
t =
t−1∏
s=0
(A+BK(T )s ) +
t∑
s=1
t−1∏
j=s
(A+BK
(T )
j )BL
(T )
s−1Σ,
where Σ = E(x10(x
2
0)
T )(E(x20(x
2
0)
T ))−1,P
(T )
T = 0, G
(T )
0 = I . Moreover, the optimal cost is
as follows:
JT (γ
∗
T
) =
2
T
[E((x10)
TP
(T )
0 x
1
0) +
T−1∑
t=0
E((w1t )
TP
(T )
t w
1
t )(4.8)
+
T−1∑
t=0
E((E(x20|x
1
0))
T [(L
(T )
t )
TBTP
(T )
t+1BL
(T )
t ]E(x
2
0|x
1
0))
+
T−1∑
t=1
E((x10)
T (AT )tP
(T )
t+1BL
(T )
t E(x
2
0|x
1
0))].
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Proof. Following from [16] and Radner’s theorem [31], person-by-person optimality
implies global optimality due to the uniqueness of the person-by-person optimal policy.
That is because the information structure is partially nested, and LQG dynamic teams can
be reduced to a static one using Ho-Chu’s static reduction [16]. Hence, we only need
to show that (4.3) and (4.4) are person-by-person optimal. In the following, we show
that for the first decision maker J(γ∗
T
, γ∗
T
) ≤ J((γ−i∗
T
, β), γ∗
T
) for all β ∈ Γi where
(γ−i∗
T
, β) = (γ0:i−1∗, β, γi+1:T−1∗). This implies that (γ∗
T
, γ∗
T
) is person-by-person opti-
mal thanks to Corollary 4.1 since the dynamic team is symmetrically optimal (by exchanging
policies (γ−i∗
T
, β) with γ∗
T
which implies J(γ∗
T
, γ∗
T
) ≤ J(γ∗
T
, (γ−i∗
T
, β)) for all β ∈ Γi and
this implies that (γ∗
T
, γ∗
T
) is the fixed point of the equation). The proof is completed by
induction. Due to space constraints, we have removed the calculation.
REMARK 7. The optimal policies (4.3) and (4.4) contain two parts which can be inter-
preted as follows: the first part, k
(T )
t x
i
t, is equivalent to the optimal policy of the branch (DM)
by ignoring the other branch in the optimization problem (in this case, this is equivalent to
the centralized policies since the information structure of each branch (DM) is centralized).
The second part corresponds to the correlation term between branches (DMs).
In the following, we generalize the result of Theorem 4.2 toN -DMLQG dynamic teams.
Assume that the dynamics for i = 1, 2, ..., N are defined as (4.1), where E(xi0(x
j
0)
T ) 6= 0 for
i, j = 1, 2, ..., N .
Problem (PN,treeT ): Consider the expected cost function as
JNT (γ
1:N
T
) =
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
E
γ1:N
T [(xit)
TQxit + (u
i
t)
TRuit +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(uit)
T R˜u
j
t + (u
j
t)
T R˜uit],
where γi
T
= γi0:T−1 for i = 1, . . . , N and R, R˜ > 0 and Q ≥ 0. Let I
i
t = {x
i
[0:t], u
i
[0:t−1]}.
COROLLARY 4.3. For a fixed T and N , consider a finite horizon team problem defined
as (PN,treeT ) (see (4.1)). If (x
1:N
0 ) are exchangeable with an identical zero mean Gaussian
distribution, and wits for i = 1, . . . , N are i.i.d. zero mean Gaussian random vectors, inde-
pendent for t = 0, . . . , T − 1, and independent of initial states, then
u
i∗,(T ),(N)
t = K
(T )
t x
i
t + L
(N),(T )
t
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
E(xj0|x
i
0),
whereK
(T )
t and P
(T )
t satisfy (4.5) and (4.6), and L
(N),(T )
t is a function ofK
(T )
0:t .
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 4.2.
In the following, we relax the assumption on the distribution of initial states and distur-
bances. Here, xi0s are not necessarily exchangeable and w
i
ts do not necessary have the same
distribution. We also consider LQ (not necessarily Gaussian) problems. To this end, we first
define the notion of a strategy-by-strategy optimal policy which will be used in Corollary 4.5.
DEFINITION 4.4. (Strategy-by-strategy optimal policy) A policy (γ1:N
T
) =
(γ10:T−1, . . . , γ
N
0:T−1) is strategy-by-strategy optimal if the following inequalities hold:
for all i = 1, . . . , N , and for all β ∈ Γi,
(4.9) J(γ1
T
, . . . , γN
T
) ≤ J(γ1
T
, . . . , γi−1
T
, β, γi+1
T
, . . . , γN
T
).
REMARK 8. Strategy-by-strategy optimality allows for joint perturbation in policies of
DMs in a given precedence graph γσ but person-by-person optimality (under the intrinsic
model) only allows perturbation for a single DM’s policy γi.
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COROLLARY 4.5. For a fixed T , consider a finite horizon team problem defined as
(P treeT ) (see (4.2)), if x
1
0 and x
2
0 have an identical zero mean Gaussian distribution and {w
i
t}s
are independent random vectors for i = 1, 2 and t = 0, . . . , T − 1 (not necessarily Gaussian
and identical for i = 1, 2 and for all t = 0, . . . , T −1), then (4.3) and (4.4) are team optimal.
Proof. Following from [16] and Radner’s theorem [31], the optimal policy and person-
by-person optimal policy are unique, hence the strategy-by-strategy optimal policy is also
unique. Hence, the set of person-by-person optimal policies, the set of strategy-by-strategy
policies, and the set of global optimal policies are coincide. We only need to show that (4.3)
and (4.4) are strategy-by-strategy optimal and this implies globally optimality thanks to the
uniqueness of such policies for this problem. Since x10 and x
2
0 are not exchangeable, the team
may not be exchangeable, hence one can not justify symmetry using Corollary 4.1; however,
we show that by fixing policies of a DM and minimizing the cost for the other one, the optimal
policy for each decision maker is identical for t = 0, . . . , T −1, and this implies that the team
is symmetrically optimal thanks to the uniqueness of the strategy-by-strategy optimal policy
for this problem. We can use dynamic programming to show (4.9) holds for (4.3) and (4.4),
and this completes the proof.
REMARK 9. The above result can be extended to the case where w1t and w
2
t are ex-
changeable for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1 (not necessarily independent), and {wit}ts are
independent zero mean Gaussian random vectors and independent of initial states (i.e.,
(w1t , w
2
t ) |= (w
1
k, w
2
k) for t 6= k, and (w
1
t , w
2
t ) |= (x
1
0, x
2
0) for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1), then
u
1∗,(T )
t = K
(T )
t x
1
t + L
(T )
t E(x
2
0|x
1
0) +
t−1∑
p=0
h
p,(T )
t E(w
2
p|w
1
p),
u
2∗,(T )
t = K
(T )
t x
2
t + L
(T )
t E(x
1
0|x
2
0) +
t−1∑
p=0
h
p,(T )
t E(w
1
p|w
2
p),
whereK
(T )
t , and L
(T )
t satisfy (4.5), and (4.7), respectively.
Following from Corollary 4.5, we present the Certainty equivalency property for symmetric
LQG teams on a tree.
THEOREM 4.6. For a fixed T , consider a finite horizon team problem defined as (P treeT )
(see (4.2)). If x10 and x
2
0 are exchangeable with an identical zero mean Gaussian distribution
and wits are mean zero i.i.d. random vectors for i = 1, 2 and for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and
independent of initial states, then the team problem is certainty equivalent, i.e., the optimal
controller’s gainsK
(T )
t and L
(T )
t are independent of the distributions of disturbances w
i
ts.
Proof. The proof similar to that of Corollary 4.3.
In the following, we develop a structural result to the case where the information structure
of each decision maker over time satisfies a structure which is identical for all DMs and is
partially nested. An example of such a graph structure has been depicted in Fig. 2.
THEOREM 4.7. For a fixed T and N , consider a finite horizon team problem defined
as (PNT ) (see (4.1)). If x
1
0 and x
2
0 are exchangeable with an identical zero mean Gaussian
distribution and wits for i = 1, 2 are i.i.d. zero mean Gaussian random vectors, independent
for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and independent of initial states, then
u
i∗,(T ),(N)
t = K
(T )
t y
i
t + L
(N),(T )
t
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
E(yj0|y
i
0),
whereK
(T )
t are obtained by considering only one DM and ignoring other DMs.
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Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.2, using the results in [16] and Corollary
4.1.
REMARK 10. A related work is [30], where structural results for optimal policy have
been obtained for finite horizon LQG problems on graphs. In our analysis above, the struc-
tural result for the optimal policy is obtained without assuming that decision makers who
have no common ancestors and no common descendants have either uncorrelated noise or
are decoupled through the cost function. Instead exchangeable partially nested LQG teams
with correlated initial states and disturbances are considered. Moreover, here, the graph
structures may not be trees in general, as opposed to [30], where a multi-tree structure has
been imposed on a graph.
In the following, we present results for LQG teams with a mean-field coupling through the
cost function. First, using Corollary 4.3, we obtain globally optimal policies forN -DM teams
with a mean-field coupling with correlated initial states and disturbances. However, we note
that in our model, the mean-field coupling is only in the cost function and not in the dynamics.
Next, as an implication of Theorem 3.2, we show the convergence of optimal polices for LQG
N -DM mean-field teams on a tree to the corresponding optimal policy of mean-field teams.
Problem (PN,MFT,LQG): Consider the expected cost function forN -DMLQG teams with a mean-
field coupling as
JNT (γ
N
T
) =
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
E
γ1:N
T [(xit)
TQxit + (u
i
t)
TRuit(4.10)
+
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(uit)
T R˜u
j
t + (u
j
t)
T R˜uit +
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(xit)
T Q˜x
j
t + (x
j
t )
T Q˜xit],
where R, R˜ > 0 andQ, Q˜ ≥ 0.
Problem (P∞,MFT,LQG): Consider the expected cost function for LQG mean-field teams as
J∞T (γT ) = lim sup
N→∞
JNT (γT ).(4.11)
Let Iit = {x
i
[0:t], u
i
[0:t−1]} for i ∈ N, and dynamics be as (4.1).
COROLLARY 4.8. For a fixed T and N , consider a finite horizon team problem defined
as (PN,MFT,LQG) (see (4.10)). If (x
1:N
0 ) are exchangeable zero mean Gaussian random vectors
with an identical distribution, and wits are i.i.d. zero mean Gaussian random vectors for
i = 1, . . . , N , independent for t = 0, . . . , T − 1, and independent of initial states, then
u
i∗,(T ),(N)
t = K
(T )
t x
i
t +
L
(N),(T )
t
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
E(xj0|x
i
0),(4.12)
whereK
(T )
t and P
(T )
t satisfy (4.5) and (4.6), and L
(N),(T )
t is a function ofK
(T )
0:t .
Proof. The proof is similar to the one in Theorem 4.2.
COROLLARY 4.9. For a fixed T , consider a finite horizon team problem defined as
(P∞,MFT,LQG) (see (4.11)). Assume {x
i
0}i∈N are exchangeable zero mean Gaussian random vec-
tors with an identical distribution, and wits are i.i.d. zero mean Gaussian random vectors for
i ∈ N, independent for t = 0, . . . , T − 1, and independent of initial states. If L
(N),(T )
t (see
(4.12)) converges pointwise as N →∞ to L
(∞),(T )
t , then
u
i∗,(T ),(∞)
t = K
(T )
t x
i
t + L
(∞),(T )
t Σx
i
0,
whereK
(T )
t and P
(T )
t satisfy (4.5) and (4.6), and Σ = E(x
1
0(x
2
0)
T )(E(x20(x
2
0)
T ))−1.
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Proof. Invoking Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 4.8; using Remark 5 completes the proof.
4.2. Average cost infinite horizons problems for partially nested dynamic teams. In
the following, we consider average cost problemswith symmetric partially nested information
structure as well as LQG dynamic teams with the one step delay sharing pattern and sparsity
constraints. We note that the optimality of linear policies for infinite horizon LQG problems
is open in its generality. In this subsection, we provide positive results for a class of such
problems.
4.2.1. Average cost infinite horizon problems for symmetric partially nested LQG
dynamic teams on a tree. Now, consider infinite horizon team problems and we use the
result in Section 4.1.
Problem (P tree∞ ): Consider the following expected cost function
J(γ1:2) = lim sup
T→∞
E
(γ1,γ2)[c(x1:20:T−1, u
1:2
0:T−1)],(4.13)
where the cost function is defined as (4.2) and Iit = {x
i
[0:t], u
i
[0:t−1]}.
First, we introduce a lemma essential for Theorem 4.11.
LEMMA 4.10. Consider the sequence {aiT}
T
i=1. Assume lim
T→∞
aiT = a for i =
0, . . . , T − 1. If for every fixed T ∈ N, alT = a
l+1
T+1 for all l = 0 . . . , T − 1, then
lim
T→∞
1
T
∑T
i=1 a
i
T = a.
Proof. We have
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
i=1
aiT = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
i=0
a1T−i = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
a1k = a,
where the second equality follows from the assumption that alT = a
l+1
T+1 and the last equality
follows from the Cesa´ro mean argument.
THEOREM 4.11. Consider average cost infinite horizon team problems defined as
(Ptree∞ ) (see (4.13)). Assume (A,B) are stabilizable and (A,Q
1
2 ) are detectable. Assume
x10 and x
2
0 are exchangeable with an identical zero mean Gaussian distribution and w
i
ts are
i.i.d. zero mean Gaussian random variables for i = 1, 2 and for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and
independent of initial states. If L
(T )
t (see (4.7)) converges pointwise to L
(∞)
t as T →∞, then
the pointwise limit of the sequence of optimal policies for (P treeT ) is team optimal for (P
tree
∞ )
and stabilizes the closed-loop system,
u
1∗,(∞)
t = Kx
1
t + L
(∞)
t E(x
2
0|x
1
0),
u
2∗,(∞)
t = Kx
2
t + L
(∞)
t E(x
1
0|x
2
0),
whereK,P, L
(∞)
t and G
(∞)
t are the pointwise limit of the ones for (P
tree
T ) as T →∞.
Proof. We show lim sup
T→∞
JT (γ
∗
T
) = J(γ∗
∞
) and invoke [35, Theorem 5] or [29, Theorem
1] to complete the proof. From (4.8), we have
lim
T→∞
|JT (γ
∗
∞
)− JT (γ
∗
T
)|
= lim
T→∞
2
T
|E((x10)
T (P
(T )
0 − P )x
1
0) +
2
T
T−1∑
t=0
E((w1t )
T (P
(T )
t − P )w
1
t )
(4.14)
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+
2
T
T−1∑
t=0
E((E(x20|x
1
0))
T [((L
(T )
t )
TBTP
(T )
t+1BL
(T )
t − ((L
(∞)
t )
TBTPBL
(∞)
t )]E(x
2
0|x
1
0))
(4.15)
+
2
T
T−1∑
t=0
E((x10)
T (AT )t−1(P
(T )
t+1BL
(T )
t − PBL
(∞)
t )E(x
2
0|x
1
0))
(4.16)
= 0,
(4.17)
where (4.14) is zero since P
(T )
0 converges to P , and using Lemma 4.10 since P
(T+1)
t+1 = P
(T )
t .
Expression (4.16) converges to zero since L
(T )
t (see (4.7)) converges pointwise to L
(∞)
t as
T →∞, we have
∑∞
s=t+1 B
T (AT )s−tPBL
(∞)
s <∞, and this implies that lim
s→∞
L
(∞)
s = 0.
Hence, we have for every ǫ > 0, there exists N > T such that for every t > N ,
|Tr[L
(∞)
t (L
(∞)
t )
T ]| < ǫ. We define L
(T )
t = 0 for t > T . Expression (4.15) is equal to
zero following from Lemma 4.10 and the fact that |Tr[L
(∞)
t (L
(∞)
t )
T ]| < ǫ for every t > N .
Hence, equality (4.17) is true and global optimality follows from [35, Theorem 5]. The
closed loop system is stable since we have, lim sup
t→∞
E(||x1t ||
2) < ∞ following from the fact
that ||A + BK|| < 1 (all the eigenvalues of A + BK are inside of the unit circle), and
||L
(∞)
t || < M .
4.2.2. Average cost team problems with one step delayed sharing pattern and spar-
sity constraints. In [24], the problem of finding a steady state solution for state feedback
average cost LQG team problems with a delay and sparsity has been considered. Under the
independence of disturbances assumption, convergence of the solution to the stabilizing solu-
tions for finite horizon of the corresponding algebraic Riccati equation has been shown [24];
however, global optimality of the limit solution has not been established. We establish global
optimality of the limit solution. Consider the following dynamics for i = 1, . . . , N ,
xit+1 =
N∑
j
Aijx
j
t +B
iju
j
t + ω
i
t,
where for a fixed i = 1, . . . , N , Aijt and B
ij
t are zero if sum of the delays along the directed
path from j to i with the shortest path, Dij , is more than one, i.e., Dij > 1. Assume x
i
0s
and ωits are mutually independent Gaussian random vectors for all i = 1, . . . , N and ω
i
ts
are independent for t = 0, . . . , T − 1 with covariance matrix Σiω. The information struc-
ture is defined as Iit = {x
j
k|j = 1, . . . , N, and k = 0, . . . , t − Dij}. This along with the
assumption on the dynamics of the system implies that the information structure is partially
nested. Since the disturbances and initial states are mutually independent, the information
structure can be decomposed into the independent sets [24]. To this end, an information
graph, Gˆ(M,F), has been defined for a graph [24]. In the following, we follow the nota-
tion in [24]. Define s
j
k as a set of all nodes reachable from node j within k steps. Define
M := {sjk|j = 1, . . . , N and k ≥ 0} and F := {(s
j
k, s
j
k+1)|j = 1, . . . , N and k ≥ 0}. The
following theorem is from [24], and gives an optimal policy for finite horizon problems. As-
sume that the delay of sharing between each decision maker is not greater than one. Assume
there are no directed cycles with a total delay of zero.
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THEOREM 4.12. [24] Consider the LQG team problem with
JT (γT ) :=
1
T
E
γ
T (
T−1∑
t=0
[xTt u
T
t ]
[
Q S
ST R
] [
xt
ut
]
),
where R > 0, Q ≥ 0, and
[
Q S
ST R
]
≥ 0, ut = (u1t , . . . , u
N
t ). Then, the optimal controller
is uTt∗ =
∑
r∋i I
{i},rKrt ζ
r
t , where r ∈ M, I
{i},r is the identity matrix partition according to
{i} and r, and
Krt = −(R
rr + (Bsr)TXst+1B
sr)−1(Srr + (Asr)TXst+1B
sr),
Xrt = Q
rr + (Asr)TXst+1A
sr − (Krt )
T (Rrr + (Bsr)TXst+1B
sr)Krt ,(4.18)
with XrT = Q
rr, and ζst+1 =
∑
r→s(A
sr + BsrKrt )ζ
r
t +
∑
ωi→s I
s,{i}ωit, with ζ
s
0 =∑
ωi→s I
s,{i}xi0, where s ∈ M is the unique node such that there is an edge between r
and s, i.e., r → s. Moreover, the optimal cost is obtained as
JT (γ
∗
T
) =
1
T
[
N∑
i=1,ωi→s
Tr((Xs0)
{i},{i}
E(xi0(x
i
0)
T ))(4.19)
+
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1,ωi→s
Tr((Xst+1)
{i},{i}Σiω)],
where (Xst+1)
{i},{i} denotes the sub-matrix (Xst+1) corresponds to the ii-th array.
In the following, we refine a related result in [24].
THEOREM 4.13. Consider the LQG team problem with
J(γ) := lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
γ(
T−1∑
t=0
[xTt u
T
t ]
[
Q S
ST R
] [
xt
ut
]
).
Assume for self loops s → s in the information graph, (Ass, Bss) is stabilizable and[
Ass − eiθ Bss
Css Rss
]
has a full column rank for every θ ∈ [0, 2π], where Css and Dss
are the matrix of the form
[
Qss Sss
(Sss)T Rss
]
=
[
Css Dss
]T [
Css Dss
]
. Then, u∞t∗ =∑
r∋i I
{i},rKr,(∞)ζ
r,(∞)
t , where K
r,(∞) = lim
T→∞
K
r,(T )
t , X
r,(∞) = lim
T→∞
X
r,(T )
t for all t
and ζ
r,(∞)
t is obtained by replacingK
r,(T )
t with K
r,(∞).
Proof. As T → ∞, we have Xr,(∞) = lim
T→∞
X
r,(T )
t for (4.18) since the the recursion
for s → s corresponds to the classical Riccati equation and X
r,(T )
t is a continuous function
ofX
s,(T )
t [24, Corollary 7]. We have,
lim
T→∞
|JT (γ
∗
∞
)− JT (γ
∗
T
)|
= lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
|
N∑
i=1,ωi→r
Tr([(X
r,(T )
t+1 )
{i},{i}Σiω − (X
r,(∞)){i},{i}Σiω]| = 0,
where (4.19) and Lemma 4.10 implies the last equality. This is because (4.18) implies that
X
r,(T+1)
t+1 = X
r,(T )
t ; hence, invoking [35, Theorem 5] implies global optimality of γ
∗
∞
. The
stability argument follows from [24, Corollary 7] and [50].
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5. Conclusion. In this paper, we studied dynamic teams with symmetric information
structure. We presented a characterization for symmetrically optimal teams for convex ex-
changeable team problems. For mean-field teams with symmetric information structure, we
show the convergence of optimal polices for mean-field teams with N decision makers to
the corresponding optimal policy of mean-field teams. We obtained global optimal solutions
for average cost finite and infinite horizon LQG dynamic team problems with symmetric
partially nested information structure. Moreover, we obtained globally optimal policies for
average cost infinite horizon state feedback problems for LQG dynamic teams with sparsity
and delay constraints.
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